Source : forum général d'éconoclaste
Anna Schwartz, 92 ans, est coauteur avec Milton Friedman de "The monetary history of the United States". Cette interview dans le WSJ est assez étonnante [online.wsj.com] . Quelques extraits :
1) Causes
How did we get into this mess in the first place? As in the 1920s, the current "disturbance" started with a "mania." But manias always have a cause. "If you investigate individually the manias that the market has so dubbed over the years, in every case, it was expansive monetary policy that generated the boom in an asset
Cf. cette discussion sur le forum [forum.econoclaste.free.fr]
2) L'analyse de la situation
In the 1930s, as Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Friedman argued in "A Monetary History," the country and the Federal Reserve were faced with a liquidity crisis in the banking sector [...] But "that's not what's going on in the market now," Ms. Schwartz says. Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their ledgers -- "all these exotic securities that the market does not know how to value."
3) Le remède pas original du Dr Schwartz
"Why are they 'toxic'?" Ms. Schwartz asks. "They're toxic because you cannot sell them, you don't know what they're worth, your balance sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don't know whom to lend to because we don't know who is sound. So if you could get rid of them, that would be an improvement." The only way to "get rid of them" is to sell them, which is why Ms. Schwartz thought that Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's original proposal to buy these assets from the banks was "a step in the right direction."
Le problème est qu'elle voit le Treasury comme un trou noir qui va faire disparaître les incertitudes sur la valorisation des actifs en question...
4) Le remède original du Dr Schwartz
"Firms that made wrong decisions should fail," she says bluntly. "You shouldn't rescue them. And once that's established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich." The trouble is, "that's not the way the world has been going in recent years."
Instead, we've been hearing for most of the past year about "systemic risk" [...] Ms. Schwartz doesn't buy it. [...]
When the authorities finally got around to letting Lehman Brothers fail, it had saved so many others already that the markets didn't know how to react. Instead of looking principled, the authorities looked erratic and inconstant.
Assez peu d'économistes ont préconisé cette politique : laisser les banques individuelles faillir pour ne pas éliminer du marché tout principe de responsabilité.
Note perso : garantir les prêts et annuler la prime de risque sur le marché interbancaire va également dans le mauvais sens. Les participants deviennent aveugles, ils n'ont plus moyen de savoir quelles sont les banques solides et fragiles.
Cela faisait plusieurs fois que Tyler Cowen faisait remarquer que la production de crédit ne semblait pas s'écrouler. Or c'est notamment cette crainte d'un gel du marché interbancaire qui justifiait l'intervention publique dans le secteur bancaire.
Aujourd'hui, T.Cowen signale une étude qui prétend démystifier le sujet, en réfutant quatre "mythes" ("idées fausses" pour SM ;-) [www.minneapolisfed.org] :
1. Bank lending to non-financial corporations and individuals has declined sharply.
2. Interbank lending is essentially nonexistent.
3. Commercial paper issuance by non-financial corporations has declined sharply and rates have risen to unprecedented levels.
4. Banks play a large role in channeling funds from savers to borrowers.
Anna Schwartz, 92 ans, est coauteur avec Milton Friedman de "The monetary history of the United States". Cette interview dans le WSJ est assez étonnante [online.wsj.com] . Quelques extraits :
1) Causes
How did we get into this mess in the first place? As in the 1920s, the current "disturbance" started with a "mania." But manias always have a cause. "If you investigate individually the manias that the market has so dubbed over the years, in every case, it was expansive monetary policy that generated the boom in an asset
Cf. cette discussion sur le forum [forum.econoclaste.free.fr]
2) L'analyse de la situation
In the 1930s, as Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Friedman argued in "A Monetary History," the country and the Federal Reserve were faced with a liquidity crisis in the banking sector [...] But "that's not what's going on in the market now," Ms. Schwartz says. Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their ledgers -- "all these exotic securities that the market does not know how to value."
3) Le remède pas original du Dr Schwartz
"Why are they 'toxic'?" Ms. Schwartz asks. "They're toxic because you cannot sell them, you don't know what they're worth, your balance sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don't know whom to lend to because we don't know who is sound. So if you could get rid of them, that would be an improvement." The only way to "get rid of them" is to sell them, which is why Ms. Schwartz thought that Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's original proposal to buy these assets from the banks was "a step in the right direction."
Le problème est qu'elle voit le Treasury comme un trou noir qui va faire disparaître les incertitudes sur la valorisation des actifs en question...
4) Le remède original du Dr Schwartz
"Firms that made wrong decisions should fail," she says bluntly. "You shouldn't rescue them. And once that's established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich." The trouble is, "that's not the way the world has been going in recent years."
Instead, we've been hearing for most of the past year about "systemic risk" [...] Ms. Schwartz doesn't buy it. [...]
When the authorities finally got around to letting Lehman Brothers fail, it had saved so many others already that the markets didn't know how to react. Instead of looking principled, the authorities looked erratic and inconstant.
Assez peu d'économistes ont préconisé cette politique : laisser les banques individuelles faillir pour ne pas éliminer du marché tout principe de responsabilité.
Note perso : garantir les prêts et annuler la prime de risque sur le marché interbancaire va également dans le mauvais sens. Les participants deviennent aveugles, ils n'ont plus moyen de savoir quelles sont les banques solides et fragiles.
et, plus tard :
Cela faisait plusieurs fois que Tyler Cowen faisait remarquer que la production de crédit ne semblait pas s'écrouler. Or c'est notamment cette crainte d'un gel du marché interbancaire qui justifiait l'intervention publique dans le secteur bancaire.
Aujourd'hui, T.Cowen signale une étude qui prétend démystifier le sujet, en réfutant quatre "mythes" ("idées fausses" pour SM ;-) [www.minneapolisfed.org] :
1. Bank lending to non-financial corporations and individuals has declined sharply.
2. Interbank lending is essentially nonexistent.
3. Commercial paper issuance by non-financial corporations has declined sharply and rates have risen to unprecedented levels.
4. Banks play a large role in channeling funds from savers to borrowers.
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